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A system is said to be meritocratic if the compensation and power available to individuals is determined by
their abilities and merits. A system is topocratic if the compensation and power available to an individual is
determined primarily by her position in a network. Here we introduce a model that is perfectly meritocratic
for fully connected networks but that becomes topocratic for sparse networks-like the ones in society. In the
model, individuals produce and sell content, but also distribute the content produced by others when they
belong to the shortest path connecting a buyer and a seller. The production and distribution of content
defines two channels of compensation: a meritocratic channel, where individuals are compensated for the
content they produce, and a topocratic channel, where individual compensation is based on the number of
shortest paths that go through them in the network. We solve the model analytically and show that the
distribution of payoffs is meritocratic only if the average degree of the nodes is larger than a root of the total
number of nodes. We conclude that, in the light of this model, the sparsity and structure of networks
represents a fundamental constraint to the meritocracy of societies.
I
n the ideal world of Arrow-Debreu, every transaction that creates a surplus takes place. Unfortunately, we
don’t live in that world. An important difference between our world and that of Arrow-Debreu is that, in our
world, every pair of individuals is not connected directly, but indirectly via networks of intermediaries, agents
and middleman who expect to benefit from their intermediating role.
As Granovetter1 pointed out more than two decades ago, our economy is embedded in social networks. These
are networks that beget commercial interactions, and that are begot by them. For Granovetter, the cultivation of
personal relationships between traders and customers assumes an equal or higher importance than the economic
transactions involved. Economic exchanges are not carried out exclusively among strangers, but often incorp-
orate individuals involved in long-term continuing relationships.
The embeddedness of markets is particularly important when links are costly. If links were costless society
would behave similar to a fully connected network, and we will be back to the idealized world of Arrow-Debreu.
When links are costly, however, embeddedness becomes extreme and markets are restricted by the structure of
the social networks that co-exist with them.
In this paper, we explore the redistributive consequences of the networks underlying economic activity by
introducing amodel with tunable embeddedness. The model separates the income of agents into two sources, the
income obtained from the content agents produce, and the income that agents obtain from their intermediation
role. We solve the model analytically and show that as networks become sparser, the model transitions from the
meritocratic regime of Arrow-Debreu to what we call a topocratic regime, where the position of an individual in a
network becomes the most important factor determining the compensation it receives.
Understanding the redistributive consequences of networks is important in a world where markets are com-
posed of a mix of socially embedded links and commercial ‘‘arm-length’’ relationships2,3. Yet, even in a world
where arm-length relationships are dominant, the assumption of fully connected networks is too hopeful.
Possible transactions might not take place because individuals are uncertain about the quality of the goods being
offered4–6 or due to search frictions7,8. These market failures are partially compensated by the emergence of
middlemen who are experts at reducing information asymmetries and search frictions, but who also act as hubs
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controlling information flows in the network. As Ronald Burt points
out, the position that a middleman occupies in the network is a
source of advantage, as intermediating positions constitute part of
what he has termed the ‘‘social capital of structural holes’’9,10.
In recent decades the social and economic role of networks has
received an increased level of recognition. Economists have modeled
the networks that emerge from strategic interactions11–14, as well as
the inequality in the distribution of payoffs expected in these equi-
librium networks15–17. Our model contributes to this literature by
separating the content producing role of an agent from its role as
an intermediary. This separation allows us to study the conditions
under which the payoffs received by an individual are determined by
the content she produces, or by her position in a social or profes-
sional network. To distinguish between these two payoff distribution
regimes, we label the outcome of the system asmeritocratic, when the
distribution of payoffs is determined primarily by an agent’s ability to
produce quality content, and topocratic when the distribution of an
agent’s payoffs is determined primarily by her position in the net-
work. We find that the transition to topocracy is mediated by net-
work density, with topocracy becoming the dominant regime of
sparse networks. In general, we find that the critical connectivity
required to transition from topocracy to meritocracy goes as a root
of the size of the network (Na), with a, 1. This non-linear relation-
ship means that the transition point is highly sensitive to both, the
structure of the network and the algorithm used to distribute payoffs
among individuals.
The implications of a root-rule of this kind can be explained by
looking at numerical examples. Consider a network with as many
nodes as people in the United States (N 5 3 3 108). In this case an
N1/2 rule implies that meritocracy kicks in for connectivities above
17,320 links per node. This is certainly too large, meaning that anN1/2
rule would imply that the U.S. is topocratic. AnN1/4 rule, on the other
hand, implies a minimum average connectivity of only 131 links per
node, which represents a reasonable number of social connections18.
Hence, when the transition from meritocracy to topocracy is
mediated by an N1/4 rule the implications for the U.S. would be that
this is likely to be meritocratic.
The fact that in our model the transition betweenmeritocracy and
topocracy depends predominantly on the density of the network has
two important implications. The first one is that the strong depend-
ence of meritocracy on density makes the results of the model robust
to different network formation mechanisms. Here, we can separate
between two possibilities. First, there is the world in which the con-
nectivity of individuals is determined largely by processes that are
exogenous to them. This is a world where connectivity begets con-
nectivity, such as in the case of the Baraba´si Albert Model19, the Yule
Process20, the Price Model21, Merton’s Cumulative Advantage (or
Matthew effect)22, or Herbert Simon’s modified version of the Yule
Process23. The second possibility is one in which the position that an
individual occupies in a network is determined endogenously, for
instance through strategic interactions11–14. Yet, when the density of
the network is bounded–due for instance to the high cost of links–
differences between link formation mechanisms, whether endogen-
ous or not, should not introduce substantial changes to the merito-
cratic properties of the system. In other words, when the density of
the network is the main feature determining whether the markets
embedded in them are meritocratic or not, the forces of endogenous
network formation will only be able to modify this outcome slightly
(we note that this is not true for an endogenous network formation
process with full information. Yet, assuming full information in the
network formation is equivalent to assuming a fully connected
network).
The second implication that we would like to highlight is that the
model predicts that meritocracy increases in societies that become
better connected. This is an important implication given current
changes in technology. Recent changes in communication technologies
have increased the connectivity of our society, by reducing the cost of
both social and commercial interactions. Most studies have empha-
sized the role of communication technologies on social participation
and collaboration. Our results suggest that this technological change
might also have important long term effects on the meritocracy of
economies. Content producers, whether these are musicians or artists,
can nowmarket their content directly to a large number of individuals,
even though this causes an information overload24,25 that puts us far
from the idealized limit of fully connected networks. Nevertheless, in
the light of this model, changes in communication technology should
increase the meritocracy of markets–when holding population size
constant. So the good news is that recent changes in technology should
help make our society more meritocratic.
Results
Modelling a networkedmarket.Consider a world where individuals
produce, distribute and consume content. The content produced by
individuals can be abstracted as widgets of low marginal production
cost, or cultural goods, such as books, films or music. To simplify the
discussion we label the content producing role of an individual as her
Rockstar role, since the payoffs collected via this role depend on the
popularity of the content she produces. We call the intermediation
role of an individual as her Middleman role, since the payoffs
collected via this role are proportional to the transactions that she
helps complete. The model is fully specified by three sets of
assumptions:
1. Initial conditions: The model begins with an exogenously deter-
mined network in which each node represents an individual.
Each individual is endowed with a single parameter T represent-
ing its Talent, or ability to contribute to society. The talent T is
fixed for the duration of the model and determines the fraction
of individuals that are willing to purchase the content produced
by an individual. For example, an individual withT5 0.3 will sell
its cultural good to 30% of all other individuals in the network.
For simplicity, we draw T from a uniform distribution (U, [0,
1]).
2. Value generation: At each time step each node produces a new
good (i.e. song, book, article, movie, etc.). These are non-rival
goods, meaning that copies can be made at no cost. The goods
made by an individual in her Rockstar role are purchased by a
fraction T of all individuals. For simplicity, we choose the price
to be constant and equal for all purchases.We later show that our
results do not depend on prices.
3. Value distribution (a.k.a. payoff structure): If a Rockstar is not
connected directly to an individual willing to purchase her con-
tent, the purchase is completed through the shortest path. In this
case, the total revenue of the sale is distributed equally between
each of the individuals in the path. For example, a purchase
completed through a path of length three will give 1/3 of the
payoff to the individual producing the content (the Rockstar),
and to each intermediary (theMiddlemen). Later, we generalize
the model to other profit sharing rules.
The assumptions and themodel are explained diagrammatically in
figure 1 A.
Assumptions (1) to (3) define a model in which individuals collect
payoffs by either producing content, or by being intermediaries in the
distribution of the content produced and consumed by others.
Hence, individuals have two sources of income: one that depends
on talent, which we call meritocratic, and one that depends on their
position in the network, which we call topocratic. We note that the
topocratic channel defined by an individual’s Middleman role is
useful for the system, since without it transactions would not be
completed. We note that the market is completed only as long as
there are indirect paths between every pair of nodes.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Meritocratic and topocratic regimes - limit cases. In a fully
connected network, the model has a trivial solution where payoffs
come solely from the production of content, since intermediation is
not necessary, and hence, avoided. In this case, the payoffs (pi) follow
Talent (Ti) exactly, since an individual with talent Ti receive a payoff
pi 5 Ti(N 2 1), where N is the number of nodes in the network
(Figure 1 B). Hence, when the network is fully connected, the model
describes a system that is perfectly meritocratic, i.e., payoffs are
perfectly correlated with talent.
In a world where the network is not fully connected the income of
an individual will depend not just on its talent, but also on the
betweenness centrality of an individual (the betweenness centrality
of a node is the number of shortest paths going through that node).
Here, the extreme case is a star-network with one central node, or
hub (Figure 1 C). In this case, a node in the periphery of the star
network receives an income equal to:
pi~ N{2ð ÞTi=2zTi ð1Þ
On the other hand, the hub receives a payoff equal to
pi~ Th i N{1ð Þ N{2ð Þ=2zTi N{1ð Þ ð2Þ
where ÆTæ is the average talent of the system, the first term represents
the revenue intermediated by the hub, and the second term repre-
sents the probability that the hub is a direct buyer of the peripheral
node’s content.
We note that the maximum possible payoff that can be obtained
from intermediation is ,N2, whereas the maximum possible payoff
that can be obtained from producing content is ,N. This large
difference emerges because the payoff that an individual gets from
its Middleman role grows with the number of possible links in the
system, which is quadratic on the number of nodes N, whereas the
maximum income for the Rockstar role is bounded by the number of
nodes in the network (N). This difference does not depend on our
choice of distribution of talents, or the way in which revenue is
distributed along the chain, so it is a fundamental difference between
the intermediation role of Middlemen and the production role of
Rockstars. It therefore represents a fundamental constraint to any
model considering this duality of behaviors.
Meritocratic and topocratic regimes - general case. Determinants
of individual payoffs.We begin by splitting the payoff collected by an
individual through each of her two roles
pi~pRizpMi ð3Þ
where pRi and pMi indicate, respectively, the payoffs from the
Rockstar and Middleman behavior.
In an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network (ER network)26 the degree of a node is
well approximated by the average degree of the network. Hence, we
can approximate the payoff that an individual gets from her Rockstar
role by her talent times the number of individuals at distance d from
her discounted by the length of the chain connecting her to each
individual. Hence, in a random network where the average connec-
tivity or degree is equal to Ækæ, pR can be approximated by:
pRi~Ti kh iz
kh i2
2
z
kh i3
3
z . . .z
kh i‘
‘
" #
~Ti
X‘
j~1
kh ij
j
, ð4Þ
where the cutoff , is equal to the average path length of the network,
which in a random network is well approximated by:
Step 1: Each individual produces
content that is bought by a fraction
T of all nodes in the network.
Content producing node (Rockstar)
Purchasing node (fraction T of all nodes)
Step 2: For each direct sale content producing individuals
(a.k.a. Rockstars) collect the full price of the purchase. For
each indirect sale, payoffs are distributed among all
individuals in the path connecting the Rockstar and
the buyer.
Payoff collected by the
Rockstar is equal to
 πR=1+1/2+1/3+1/4=25/12
For the sale of the one Rockstar highlighted above
this middleman collects a payoff πM=1/3+1/4=7/12
Star Network:
In a star network, the central
node (hub) collects a payoff of:
π=(N-1)T+(N-1)(N-2)<T>/2,
whereas peripheral nodes 
collect a payoff
of π=(N-2)T/2+T
Fully Connected Network:
In a fully connected
network the total
payoff of each
node is equal to: 
π=(N-1)T
Here N is the total number of nodes in the network, T is a node’s talent, <T> is the average talent of the nodes in the network, and the
total payoff π of a node is equal to the payoff received from her role as a Rockstar and a Middleman: π=πR+πM  
A MODEL SCHEMA
LIMIT CASESB C
Figure 1 | (A) Schematic representation of model. (B) Solution for a fully connected network. (C) Solution for a star-network.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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‘^
lnN
ln kh i ð5Þ
The income that individuals earn from their behavior asMiddlemen,
pM can be obtained by noticing that in every non-direct sale con-
ducted through a chain of length d, the d 2 1 middlemen particip-
ating get an equal share of the purchase. In this way, the total income
in the network that is collected byMiddlemen can bewritten similarly
to (4), as
PM~
X
j
pMj~N Th i
kh i2
2
z
2 kh i3
3
z
3 kh i4
4
z . . .z
‘{1ð Þ kh i‘
‘
" #
~N Th i
X‘
j~2
j{1
j
kh ij:
ð6Þ
The payoff collected by a singlemiddleman can be obtained by taking
the share of shortest paths going through an agent with degree ki. In a
random network the number of shortest paths going through a node
is given by k2i
.X
j
k2j
27. Hence, the average payoff collected by a
Middleman is:
pMi~N Th i
k2iP
u k
2
u
X‘
j~2
j{1
j
kh ij~k2i
Th i
kh i2z kh i
X‘
j~2
j{1
j
kh ij: ð7Þ
Finally, we can use equations (4) and (7) to write down a general
formula for the payoff p of individual i as a function of both, its talent
Ti and its connectivity ki.
This formula takes the general form:
pi~CTizBk
2
i ð8Þ
where C and B are given by
C~
X‘
j~1
kh ij
j
and B~
Th i
kh i2z kh i
X‘
j~2
j{1
j
kh ij.
We note we have assumed all nodes to belong to the network’s
giant component–there are no isolated nodes or clusters in the net-
work. For networks made of several components our results are still
valid by considering N to be the number of nodes in the component
in question.
For sparse networks, as Figure 2 illustrates, high payoff individuals
concentrate on the core of the network irrespective of their talent.
Conversely, when the network becomes denser, the opposite
becomes true: talented individuals, irrespective of their position in
the network, are the ones collecting the highest payoffs.
Transition threshold. Since the model is perfectly meritocratic for a
fully connected network, and highly topocratic for a star network, the
natural question to ask is when does the transition between merito-
cracy and topocracy takes place. We define the regime as merito-
cratic when the fraction of payoffs paid for the creation of content is
larger than the fraction of payoffs paid for their distribution (see
Methods for an alternative definition based on the correlation
between talent and payoffs). Formally, we can express this as:
PR
P
w 1
2
where PR corresponds to aggregate payoffs associated with the role
of Rockstars andP corresponds to aggregate total payoffs. For an ER
network, the regime will be meritocratic if the following condition
holds for the relationship between average connectivity and network
size (see Methods for derivation):
kh iwN1=2 ð9Þ
Figure 3 shows how the wealth generated in the model is distributed
between the two possible activities, Rockstars and Middlemen, as a
function of the average network connectivity. The transition point
from topocracy tomeritocracy (Ækæ5N1/2) is indicated with a dashed
vertical line.We note that for small values of Ækæ the total payoff of the
system decreases, since the network becomes fragmented and there
are transactions that are not completed.
Finally, we note that there is also a structural interpretation for the
Ækæ5N1/2 threshold.When the average connectivity of the network is
equal to the square root of the total number of nodes, the average
distance in the network is two, meaning that individuals are no
further than two hops away. Hence, the Ækæ 5 N1/2 rule obtained in
this case is equivalent to saying that topocracy emerges in random
networks when the average path length is larger than two, and hence,
that six-degrees of separation imply a highly topocratic system.
Alternative sharing rule: comissions.Next, we extend the model to
a payoff sharing rule inwhichMiddlemen get a percentage of the total
transactions in which they participate. For instance, they get a 10
percent commission of the transactions in which they are directly
involved. We note that this is not the same as a ten percent
commission of the entire purchase. For example, in a purchase of
an item of price one completed by a chain of length three, the first
Figure 2 | Payoff distribution for different levels of average connectivity on a network of size N 5 250.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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middlemen gets 0.1, the second gets (1 2 0.1)3 0.1 5 0.09 and the
Rockstars gets 1 2 0.1 2 0.09 5 0.81.
With these assumptions, the payoff of a Rockstar is given by
pRi~T
X‘
i~1
kh ii 1{að Þi{1, ð10Þ
which yields the following conditions for the regime to be merito-
cratic (see Methods for derivation):
kh iwN ln 1{að Þln 1{að Þ=2 ð11Þ
Figure 4 shows the share of total payoffs collected by Rockstars and
Middlemen as a fraction of the average connectivity (Ækæ) and the
percentage collected by each middlemen (a). When a is small, the
transition to meritocracy takes place at low connectivities. For
instance, when a 5 0.1 the transition to meritocracy takes place at
Ækæ5N0.13. For a network withN5 107 nodes this implies a threshold
connectivity of just Ækæ 5 8, meaning that very little connectivity is
required for the system to become meritocratic. For large percen-
tages, however, the transition tomeritocracy is not that easy.When a
5 1/2 the transition is once again at Ækæ 5 N1/2. The N1/2 rule might
seem counterintuitive when considering a percentage rule, since in a
percentage rule a 50% commission would imply an extremely fast
decay on the remainder received by the Rockstar. Yet, when Ækæ 5
N1/2 all individuals are on average, nomore than two hops away from
each other, and hence the payoffs are not distributed via long chains.
Discussion
For inequality to exist, there must be a story justifying why those at
the top are entitled to more than those at the bottom. Centuries ago,
European monarchs used divinity to justify their privileged posi-
tions. It was their connection to God what made them special, and,
ultimately legitimized their special status28. In our modern era, jus-
tifying inequality based on divine right is no longer acceptable and a
number of scientific dictums have emerged to fill the societal role
once filled by holy explanations. Marx and Friedman pronounced
themselves in this area, and although they did not share their view on
economics, they shared the sense of poetry in their expression. In The
Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx famously said ‘‘From each
according to his ability, to each according to his need’’29. Through
this phrase Marx attempted to convey what he thought should be the
economic relationship between an individual and society: indivi-
dual’s contribute according to their ability, but should receive
according to their need. More than 100 years later Friedman used
Marx phrasing to voice what he thought was the right interpretation
of this relationship ‘‘to each according to what he and the instru-
ments he owns produce’’30.
Economies, however are made of more than talents and property.
As the social capital and embeddedness theory has often
remarked1–3,9,10,31, people are structured in social networks. These
networks can be instrumental drivers of inequality in centrally
planned economies, but also in free markets, where connections to
business elites can take the role that connections to party leaders have
in autocratic regimes. Networks, thus, affect the functioning of
decentralized economies and limit the often desired equality of
opportunity since they help determine the information and resources
available to each individual. In the context of equality of opportun-
ities, John Rawls argues that equality of fair opportunity will only be
satisfied in a society where the same native talent and the same
ambition have the same prospects of success32,33. Policy-makers
who adhere to Rawles ideas have emphasized the field-leveling role
of inheritance taxes, education and anti-discriminatory policies in
the labor market. Yet, opportunities are not constrained only by
talents, education and property, but also by the connections available
to each individual, which cannot be taxed. Hence a thorough under-
standing of the meritocracy of market mechanisms cannot be
achieved without understanding the effects of an individual’s posi-
tion in a network and its relative effect with respect to other forms of
advantage where field leveling policies do exist.
In a 21st century context the results of this paper also speak about
the social changes that are implied by recent changes in technology.
In recent years the emergence of the internet has given rise to a world
in which it is much easier for individuals to market directly to each
other, or at least, through one large intermediator (such as iTunes,
Amazon or eBay). Our model predicts that these changes should
increase the meritocracy of society since they help reduce the long
chain of intermediations that consume valuable payoffs in a poorly
connected society.
But does this mean that denser networks are unambiguously pre-
ferable to sparser networks? Not quite. Making such a judgement
would require weighing the effects that network density has on mer-
itocracy with its effect on other social and economic outcomes. Social
networks do not only affect the distribution of payoffs among con-
tent producers and middlemen, but also are known to affect the
outcome of coordinated collective action. For instance, evolutionary
Figure 3 | Share of total payoffs (eq. 13) as a function of the average
network connectivity for a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network and a
proportional payoff sharing rule.
α=0.1 α=0.5 α=0.75α=0.2
Rockstars
Middlemen
Figure 4 | Share of total payoffs as a function of average network
connectivity for a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network and a sequential payoff
sharing rule according to equation(18).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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game theory suggests that cooperative strategies are more likely to
emerge in networks that are not highly connected. In a public good
game sparse network prevents free-riders from prospering because
free-riders cannot sustain enough links to exploit multiple neigh-
bors34–36. Thus, in a sparse network, the same agents that benefit from
their position as middleman might be the same agents that play a
crucial role enhancing cooperation. Therefore, making a judgement
on whether a denser or sparser network is more beneficial for society
in general, is amatter that cannot be answered easily, since it requires
weighing the effects of the network structure on meritocracy and
cooperation, but also, on other relevant outcomes, from the preser-
vation of cultural diversity to the spread of disease.
Finally, the model also invites us to explore a number of different
generalizations. Two generalizations seem particularly interesting.
First, is the development of an endogenous model in which indivi-
duals can invest in the creation of new links, or could modify their
talent, for instance, by investing in education. The ability of such a
dynamic process to restore the meritocracy of the system, will be
limited whenever the maximum connectivity of nodes is bounded.
This is likely to be true due to time constraints and the limited
cognitive capacities of individuals, but it would nevertheless be inter-
esting to explore the strategies that can help balance meritocracy in a
limited setting. The other generalization involves the use of a model
of this kind to explain the properties of real world networks. In
particular, one could venture that the organization of society around
small social groups might be a way for large groups of people to form
structures that can ensure meritocracy in the local context of a group
of peers. More research will be required to answer these questions
and help us elucidate the role that networks play in defining the
boundaries between meritocracy and topocracy.
Methods
Threshold computation for the uniform sharing rule. We use equation (8) to
calculate the total payoffs associated with the Rockstar role:
XN
i~1
CTi~C Th iN ð12Þ
Dividing theRockstar payoffs (PR) by the total payoffs paid in the entire system (P5
N(N 2 1)ÆTæ) shows that the fraction of payoffs assigned through the Rockstar
channel is equal to:
PR
P
~
C
N{1
ð13Þ
Finally, we ask for this ratio to be larger than 1/2 to obtain the condition
CwN{1
2
ð14Þ
We can solve this condition analytically for a randomER network by assuming a large
network (N? 1) and an average degree larger than one (Ækæ. 1). This implies that we
can approximate C by the largest term of the sum in eqn. (6). Using the expression for
, in equation (5) we can re-express (14) as:
N{1
2
v
Xl
i
kh ii
i
^
kh il
l
~
kh ilnN=ln kh i
lnN=ln kh i ð15Þ
Finally, using the change of variable u 5 ln Ækæ/lnN in (15), and approximating
N{1ð Þ=N^1 the condition becomes
1
2
vu, ð16Þ
which is equivalent to: Ækæ . N1/2.
Threshold computation for the percentage sharing rule. For the sharing rule
involving commissions, the total payoff collected by Rockstars (when k(1 2 a) . 1)
can be approximated by:
PR~N Th i
X‘
i~1
kh ii 1{að Þi{1^N Th i kh i‘ 1{að Þ‘{1, ð17Þ
The total payoffs paid by the system (P5N(N2 1)ÆTæ) are not changed by the payoff
sharing rule. Hence, the fraction of the payoff collected by the Rockstars through the
meritocratic channel can be obtained similarly than before as:
PR
P
~ 1{að Þ lnNln kh i{1, ð18Þ
which yields to the condition kh iwN ln 1{að Þln 1{að Þ=2.
The statistical meritocracy of networks. Here, we present an statistical method to
estimate the meritocracyM and topocracy T of the model. Instead of looking at a
threshold of PR/P, we define the meritocracyM as the correlation between an
individual’s contribution to the network, represented by its talent Ti, and the total
payoff pi collected by the individual. Topocracy is defined as the correlation between
connectivity (ki) and payoff (pi) Formally, we define meritocracy in terms of
Pearson’s correlation as:
M~corr ~T,~p
 
: ð19Þ
By definition, when the network is fully connected, the system is perfectly
meritocratic, since in that limitpi5 (N2 1)Ti and henceM~corr ~T, N{1ð Þ~T
h i
~1.
In general we can express the total payoff of an individual as the sum of its
contributions coming from the creation and distribution of content. Hence, we can
rewrite (19) as:
M~corr ~T,~pRz~pM
 
: ð20Þ
Next, we decompose the correlation function in its covariance and standard deviation
components to obtain:
M~corr ~T,~pRz~pM
 
~
cov ~T,~pR
 
zcov ~T,~pM
 
sTspRzpM
: ð21Þ
Finally we use the properties of the variance and covariance, and the fact that
cov ~T,pM
! ~0 to obtain:
M~ Cs
2
T
sT
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2pRzs
2
pM
q ð22Þ
We can further simplify (22) by noticing that T and pR are uniformly distributed. For
this reason, s2T~1=12 and s
2
pR
~C2

12. With this, equation (22) simplifies to:
M~ Cﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C2z12s2pM
q ð23Þ
By the same token, we can estimate the topocracy, of the system as the correlation
between k2 and the total payoff
T~corr k2!,~pRz~pM
 
~
spMﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C2=12zs2pM
q ð24Þ
Finally, we note that bothM and T can be evaluated analytically for a sparse ER
network by taking into account that in this case
Figure 5 | Meritocracy (full red line) and topocracy (full blue line), as
defined in equations (23) and (24) as a function of the average network
connectivity. The corresponding values obtained by numerical simulation
using 500 realizations in a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with N 5 1000
nodes are shown for comparison with red and blue dots, respectively.
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spM~B
2 kh i 1z6 kh iz4 kh i2 : ð25Þ
The last two expressions are illustrated in Figure 5, and show that the meritocracy of
the system,M, decreases (from 1 to 0) as the network becomes sparse and s2pM
increases, while the opposite is true for the topocracy, T , which approaches one for
s2pM?C
2

12. We note, however, that there is a decrease in topocracy at low
connectivities that is not accompanied by an increase in meritocracy. This is due to
the fact that as ÆkæR 1 the network becomes disconnected, and purchases are only
completed in the connected components.
Generalization to arbitrary prices. Do prices have an effect on the connectivity
threshold separating the meritocratic and topocratic regime of the system that was
discussed in Meritocratic and topocratic regimes - general case. To explore this
question we assume that each individual sells her content at a price si. Under this
assumption the total payoff collected by rockstars is equal to:
PR~
X
i
pRi~C
X
i
Tisi ð26Þ
whereas the total payoff of the system is given by
P~PRzPA~
X
i
X
j=i
Tisi~ N{1ð Þ
X
i
Tisi: ð27Þ
Hence, the threshold condition PR/P 5 C/(N 2 1) is identical than the one found
when the prices are equal for all individuals. This means that the threshold separating
the meritocratic and topocratic regimes (k 5 N1/2) is valid for an arbitrary vector of
prices, and is therefore true even for a system where prices are not in equilibrium.
Moreover, we note that the equalityPR/P5C/(N2 1) depends only onC ~k
 
, which
is a structural parameter of the network. Hence, generalizations of these results to
alternative network topologies will always be independent of prices and are reduced to
determining the relationship betweenN and~k that satisfies the conditionC/(N2 1)$
1/2.
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